阅读他最近向美国经济学会(American Economic Association)发表的演讲时，我起初怀疑这是场恶作剧。他在演讲中为美联储在住宅泡沫期间的行动进行了辩护。他非但没有承认，2002年至2006年间，自己和前任前任艾伦?格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)将过低的利率维持了太长时间，致使局面变得一团糟，反而表示美联储的政策是合理的，住宅价格上涨的主要原因不是廉价的资金，而是松懈的监督。Searching in vain for a punch line, I was reminded of Talleyrand's quip about the restored Bourbon monarchs: They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Mr Bernanke is far smarter than Louis XVIII and Charles X, two notorious boneheads, and has done a good job of firefighting. But his unwillingness to admit the Fed's role in inflating the housing and broader credit bubble raises serious questions about his judgment.我试图找出笑话中的点睛之笔，却没有结果，让我想起塔列朗(Talleyrand)对复辟的波旁王朝君主的嘲讽：他们什么都没有学会，也什么都没忘记。伯南克比路易十八(Louis XVIII)和查理十世(Charles X)这两个臭名昭著的傻瓜要聪明得多，而且救火工作也做得不错。但他不愿承认美联储在催生房市泡沫和更广泛的信贷泡沫中所扮演的角色，令人对他的判断力产生了严重质疑。The individual elements of his presentation were questionable enough ? is it really plausible to suggest that record low mortgage rates did not contribute much to the rise in US house prices but most disturbing was its failure to address the larger picture: from the mid-1990s, the Fed adopted a stance that encouraged irresponsible risk-taking. In periods of growth, it raised interest rates slowly, if at all, stubbornly refusing to acknowledge the course of asset prices. But when a recession or financial blow-up beckoned, it slashed rates and acted as a lender of last resort.他演讲中的个体因素就够令人质疑的了难道认为创纪录低水平的抵押贷款利率对于推高美国房价没有多大贡献，这种观点真的看似有理吗？但最令人不安的是，演讲未能从大处着眼：从上世纪90年代中期开始，美联储采取了一种助长不负责任的冒险行为的立场。在经济增长期，美联储固执地拒绝承认资产价格的变化轨迹，即便提高利率，速度也相当缓慢。但在经济衰退或金融危机向其招手的时候，美联储便大幅下调利率，并担当起最终借款人的角色。On Wall Street, this asymmetric approach came to be known as the Greenspan put. It gave financial institutions the confidence to raise their speculative bets, using borrowed cash to do it. None of the Fed's actions since then have addressed this central issue of moral hazard. Indeed, the problem may have become worse. For all the damage that the financial industry has inflicted on itself, when disaster arrived the Greenspan/Bernanke put did pay off. By slashing the funds rate and providing emergency credit facilities to stricken financial firms, the Fed further entrenched the perception that its ultimate role is to provide a safety net for Wall Street.在华尔街，这种不对称的措施如今被称作格林斯潘对策(Greenspan put)。它让金融机构得以放心地利用借来的资金提高投机性赌注。美联储后来的任何行动都未能解决这个道德风险的核心问题。事实上，问题可能已变得更糟。尽管金融业给自己造成了伤害，但当灾难来临时，格林斯潘/伯南克对策确实发挥了作用。通过大幅削减联邦基金利率、向受灾的金融机构提供紧急信贷安排，美联储进一步确立了一种理念，即它的终极角色是为华尔街提供安全保障。Unlike his predecessor, Mr Bernanke recognises the problem of excessive speculation and the massive externalities its sudden reversal can impose. In that sense, intellectual progress has been made. But he and his deputy, Donald Kohn, still refuse to acknowledge the Fed's role in motivating reckless behaviour.与前任不同，伯南克承认过度投机问题及其突然逆转可能造成的严重外部性。从这个意义上来说，他取得了知性方面的进步。但他和他的副手唐纳德?科恩(Donald Kohn)仍然拒绝承认，美联储促动了不计后果的行为。?6?5Take its current commitment to maintaining rock bottom rates for an extended period. Hedge funds and Wall Street dealing desks view this as an open invitation to borrow as much as they can and invest it in risky assets. As former Citigroup chief executive Chuck Prince might have put it, the music is playing, and it is time to dance. (The danger of being left without a chair when the music stops is greatly mitigated by the Fed's promise to provide ample warning of it unplugging the sound system.) ?6?5以其目前在较长时期内保持最低利率水平的承诺为例。对冲基金和华尔街投行的自营交易部门认为，这是在公开邀请它们尽可能借款，并投资于高风险资产。花旗集团(Citigroup)前首席执行官查克?普林斯(Chuck Prince)可能会说：音乐已经响起，跳舞的时间到了。（美联储承诺在拔掉音响系统插头前会提供充分警告，极大地缓和了当音乐终止时找不到座位的风险。）Mr Bernanke and Mr Kohn remain opposed to using interest rate rises to burst bubbles in their early stages. Mr Bernanke says this task should fall on a new systemic risk council of senior regulators. You do not have to be a devotee of Milton Friedman to wonder where these super-regulators will be found ? surely not at the Fed, which botched its supervision of mortgage lenders and bank holding companies.伯南克和科恩依然反对在早期阶段利用加息来戳破泡沫。伯南克称，这项任务应当由高级监管官员组成的新系统风险委员会承担。即便不是米尔顿?弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)的信徒，你也会想知道这些超级监管官员将从何而来当然不会来自美联储，它在监管抵押贷款放贷机构和银行控股公司方面表现得一团糟。But the problem goes deeper than one of hiring. When credit is artificially cheap and asset prices are rising, banks have enormous incentives to circumvent capital requirements. In such circumstances, even the smartest regulators will struggle to contain a dangerous rise in leverage.但问题远比从哪里雇人要深刻得多。当信贷成本被人为压低，资产价格不断上升时，银行有巨大的动机绕过资本金规定。在这种情况下，即便是最精明的监管者也会很难遏制杠杆率的危险上升。In seeking to separate decisions about interest rates from issues of financial stability, Mr Bernanke is returning to the wishful thinking of the Greenspan era. In a financially driven economy, it takes vigorous oversight and a responsible monetary policy to prevent bubbles. Before the next boom gets under way, the Fed needs a credible commitment to limiting leverage and raising interest rates and doing what is necessary to shock people out of cloud-cuckoo land. The last thing we need is a return to the misguided policies that got us into this mess. Until Mr Bernanke pledges a decisive break with Mr Greenspan's legacy, his confirmation for another four years should be put on hold.为了将利率决定与金融稳定问题区别开来，伯南克重新打起了格林斯潘时代的如意算盘。在一个受金融业推动的经济体中，防止泡沫形成需要强有力的监管和负责任的货币政策。在下一个繁荣时期开启之前，美联储需要做出可靠的承诺：限制杠杆率、提高利率、并采取必要行动将人们从乌托邦的幻境中惊醒。我们最不需要的就是再次采用导致我们陷入这场混乱的错误政策。在伯南克发誓与格林斯潘的传统决裂之前，应该暂缓批准他连任四年。John Cassidy is author of How Markets Fail and a staff writer at the New Yorker